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Abstract
We study the interplay between competition and trust as e¢ ciency-
enhancing mechanisms in the private provision of money. With com-
mitment, trust is automatically achieved and competition ensures ef-
￿ciency. Without commitment, competition plays no role. Trust does
play a role but requires a lower bound on e¢ ciency. Stationary in-
￿ ation must be positive and, therefore, the Friedman rule cannot be
achieved.
The quality of money can only be observed after its purchasing
capacity is realized. In that sense money is an experience good. We
show that the two problems, the time-inconsistency in the private
provision of money and moral-hazard in the provision of experience
goods, are isomorphic, and therefore the same results are attained in
both settings.
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11 Introduction
Can currency be e¢ ciently provided by competitive markets? A traditional
laissez-faire view ￿as, for example, has been expressed by Hayek ￿based on
a ￿Bertrand competition￿argues that competition drives the price of money
to its marginal cost. Therefore, if the marginal cost of producing currency is
zero, competition drives nominal interest rates to zero and private provision
of currency is e¢ cient.
We show that there is a major ￿ aw in this ￿Bertrand competition￿ar-
gument, when applied to ￿at money. When suppliers of currency cannot
commit to their future actions, then competition loses its bite. The reason
for this is that, while currencies compete on their promised rates of return,
once agents hold a particular currency there may be an incentive for the
issuer to in￿ ate the price of goods in terms of this currency, reducing, in
this way, the outstanding liabilities. Current currency portfolios have been
pre-speci￿ed, while there is full ￿ exibility to choose tomorrow￿ s portfolios.
Currencies compete for tomorrow￿ s portfolios. When choices are sequential,
currencies are no longer perfect substitutes; in a sense, they are not sub-
stitutes at all. Does ￿Bertrand competition￿ still drive promised rates of
return to the e¢ cient level? Not if those promises are not credible, if issuers
of currencies are not trusted.
Private provision of currencies is by no means the only case where produc-
ers compete for promises and the standard ￿Bertrand competition￿argument
does not apply. Competition in experience goods - those whose quality can
only be revealed by consuming the good - has similar properties. ￿Bertrand
competition￿can only a⁄ect market prices, but not the qualities which are
observed ex-post. Firms have an incentive to be ￿￿ y-by-night￿providing low
quality products. So in a monopolistic competition context, even if goods
are close substitutes, competition may not discipline ￿rms.
Many services provided by specialists (plumbers, surgeons, ￿nancial inter-
mediaries, etc.) are experience goods: the e⁄ort of the specialist a⁄ects the
quality of the service (in ￿xing the plumbing, performing a surgical operation,
managing a hedge fund, or rating securities), while such quality can only be
ex-post imperfectly observed by the non-specialist consumer. For most of
these services, warranties designed to mitigate the moral hazard problem are
di¢ cult to enforce and usually do not exist.
In this paper we show that while the provision of money and the provision
2of experience goods seem a priori very di⁄erent problems (the former being a
moral hazard problem and the latter a time inconsistency problem) they are
indeed isomorphic regarding the interplay between competition and trust.
In a dynamic economy, ￿rms are concerned for their future market posi-
tion, and the need to build up reputation may be enough to discipline ￿rms
to e⁄ectively provide high quality goods. Similarly, the ￿trust mechanism￿
may resolve the time inconsistency problem in the supply of money: concern
for the future circulation of money may deter currency issuers from creating
in￿ ation. Nevertheless, reputation concerns exist as long as quality-goods
suppliers (or currency suppliers) expect su¢ ciently high future pro￿ts to re-
frain from capturing the short-term pro￿ts. Does competition, by driving
down pro￿ts, enhance e¢ ciency but also destroy the disciplinary properties
of the ￿trust mechanism￿ ? The analysis of this trade-o⁄ is the central con-
tribution of this paper.
The paper is organized as follows: we start with the simplest case of
consumption goods in a model with monopolistic competition, as in Dixit
and Stiglitz. In that model, one parameter controls the degree of compe-
tition between di⁄erentiated goods, so it is a very useful starting point for
an analysis of the interaction between competition and trust. In studying
dynamic monopolistic competition in the quality-goods markets (Section 2),
we ￿rst consider the case of perfect observability, where the equilibrium is
uniquely determined, and indexed by the degree of substitutability. As goods
become closer substitutes, the equilibrium becomes more e¢ cient, achieving
Pareto e¢ ciency in the limiting case of perfect substitution. However, when
quality is only observed with a lag, the mark-up must be bounded away from
zero so as to guarantee enough future pro￿ts to make it worthwhile for ￿rms
to be trustworthy. The rate of time preferences de￿nes the lower bound on
mark-ups. More precisely, we ￿rst show that any price covering such a mark-
up can be the outcome of a symmetric stationary sustainable equilibrium.
Increasing the degree of substitutability does not a⁄ect the set of equilibria,
therefore competition plays no role.
We then analyze, in Section 3, the model of currency competition where
goods are supplied in perfectly competitive markets, and consumers can buy
these goods by using any of a continuum of di⁄erentiated currencies. Each
currency is supplied by a pro￿t maximizing ￿rm. Even though the currencies
are imperfect substitutes, by making the degree of substitutability arbitrar-
ily large we can characterize the limiting economy of perfect substitution
among currencies. The parallel with the case of perfect observability is the
3case with full commitment. In this case, currency competition achieves the ef-
￿cient (Friedman rule) monetary equilibrium, as Hayek had envisioned. The
analysis of equilibria without full commitment is isomorphic to the case of
imperfect observability in the experience goods model. The equivalent of the
lower bound on mark-ups is a non-negativity condition on in￿ ation, which
must be guaranteed for issuers of currency to be trustworthy. The analysis
in this section makes it clear that the essence of the relationship between
competition and trust is the same as in the case of experience goods. It is in
this sense that we state that money is an experience good.
Our two main results extend to other goods and services that can be
made isomorphic to our experience goods model. That is, i) the existence of
a lower bound on e¢ ciency de￿ned by the need to ￿ sustain trust￿ , and ii) an
indeterminacy of expectations sustaining trust that may result in competition
playing no role.
Our work is related to di⁄erent strands of literature. In the industrial
organization literature on experience goods, our work is closely related to
Shapiro (1983).1 He considers a similar model of monopolistic competition
in which consumers￿expectations regarding quality follow an ad-hoc exoge-
nous process. He does not study the trade-o⁄s between competition and
reputation. In contrast, we consider rational expectations of quality and, as
we have said, our central theme is the study of those trade-o⁄s.
The issue of currency competition has been the subject of an extensive
academic debate. This debate has seen many supporters of free competi-
tion making an exception when it comes to money (Friedman, 1960), while
advocates of free currency competition (notably, Hayek 1974 and 1978, and
Rocko⁄, 1975) have been somewhat isolated. In spite of this, the relatively
recent reappraisal of the self-regulating properties of free banking2 has raised
new interest in the study of currency competition.
The problem of time-inconsistency of monetary policies has been exten-
1In our terminology we follow Cabral, who in his monograph The Economics of Repu-
tation and Trust (in progress), uses the term ￿ reputation￿in referring to adverse selection
problems (reputation regarding an unobservable type) and ￿ trust￿in referring to moral haz-
ard problems (trust regarding a hidden action). See also Tirole (1988) for an introductory
account of the IO literature.
2See, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1996), Dowd (1992), King (1983), Rolnick and
Weber (1983), Selgin (1987), Selgin & White (1987), Vaubel (1985), and, more generally,
White (1993) . See also Schuler (1992), for an account of historical episodes of free banking,
and Hayek (1974,1978), Dowd (1992) and White (1993) for a broad perspective on the
literature on free banking.
4sively studied since Calvo (1978)3, but with the partial exceptions of Klein
(1974) and Taub (1985 and 1986), the currency competition argument has
not been considered. Klein understood that the problem of currency compe-
tition could not be studied independently of the time inconsistency problem.
Like Shapiro (1983), he postulated ad-hoc beliefs, so the way competition
and reputation interplay in determining equilibrium outcomes is not ana-
lyzed. He raised some of the questions we address in this paper but without a
full characterization as we do here. Taub (1985) studies two distinct regimes:
one with full commitment with non-stationary (￿time-inconsistent￿ ) policies,
and another in which polices are constrained to be ￿time-consistent￿(sta-
tionary). He shows that in the commitment case, the Friedman rule emerges
as the competitive outcome, while in the ￿time-consistent￿case the outcome
is ine¢ cient and, as a result, he argues in favor of the ￿natural monopoly￿
argument. While we have the same result when there is full commitment,
our analysis of the ￿non-commitment case￿di⁄ers substantially. Taub (1986)
considers the problem of currency competition in a model in which the gov-
ernment can commit for a given number of periods. He obtains results that
are similar to ours, although in our model what prevents ￿rms from choosing
￿ y-by-night strategies is endogenous reputation, rather than exogenous com-
mitment. Finally, Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (2003) analyze the e⁄ects of
electronic money, and other currency substitutes, competition on monetary
policy but abstracting from reputational issues, which is the central topic of
this paper.
2 A model of monopolistic competition with
experience goods
Our model is a version of the model of monopolistic competition of Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), with experience goods. Consider an economy with a large
number of identical households that gain utility from services and leisure.




t [U(yt) ￿ ￿nt], (1)
3See, for example, Chang (1998), Chari & Kehoe (1990), Ireland (1994) and Stokey
(1991).
5where U is increasing and concave and, without loss of generality, U(0) = 0,








with ￿ > 1. y(i)t denotes the services derived from the consumption of good
i 2 [0;1]. Each of the goods can be provided with variable quality, q(i)t = 0
or 1.
Time must be devoted to production, according to the linear technology
y(i)tq(i)t = n(i)t,





We assume that there is a single monopolist that produces each good.
Producers have, at any time, the option of producing ￿ fake￿units of the
consumption good that are costless to produce. A key assumption for the
characterization of the equilibria is whether consumers can distinguish the
high quality goods from the low quality ones before they buy them. We
proceed to characterize the equilibrium when the quality of consumption
goods are observed before they are purchased.
2.1 Monopolistic competition with perfect observabil-
ity
If the quality of the good is public information, there exists a unique equilib-
rium in this model economy with monopolistic competitive ￿rms. Each ￿rm
sets the price equal to a constant mark up over the unitary marginal cost.
In each period t, the representative household chooses the number of
units of each good ito purchase, y(i)t, as well as work e⁄ort, nt, in order to






(p(i)ty(i)t ￿ ￿(i)t)di ￿ nt
￿
￿ 0,
6where ￿(i)t are the per-capita pro￿ts of ￿rm i, p(i)t is the price of goods in
units of labor time, and Qt is the price of labor at time t, in units of labor








￿ q(i)t = ￿p(i)t, (2)
for all i and t. When q(i)t = 0, then y(i)t = 0.

























t (p(i)ty(i)t ￿ q(i)ty(i)t): (4)
Since with q(i)t = 0, y(i)t = 0, and pro￿ts will be zero, then the ￿rms will
choose to provide high quality goods, q(i)t = 1. They choose the prices to
maximize pro￿ts (4) subject to the demand functions (3). This is a static
problem. As the demand function has constant price elasticity, the optimal
price per unit of service of each good will be
p(i)t = ￿: (5)




must hold in equilibrium. The unique equilibrium will be characterized by a
price which will be constant over time and across goods
p = ￿; (6)
7as equation (5) shows. Therefore, the quantity of services of the goods,
yt = y, will be constant and will satisfy the following condition
U
0(y) = ￿￿ (7)
The value of the parameter ￿ determines the substitutability of the goods.
The closer is ￿ to one, the higher is the degree of substitutability. Note that
as ￿ approaches one, the mark-up goes to zero and the equilibrium is a
perfectly competitive one. On the other hand, as ￿ gets larger, so do the
mark-ups. Note that we are not allowing for free entry, so pro￿ts will indeed
be positive except in the limiting case in which ￿ ￿! 1:
Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium that is closer to the e¢ cient out-
come, the closer is the parameter ￿ to one. Indeed only in the limit, the
marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of transformation. The
increased substitutability between goods increases competition and increased
competition implies an outcome closer to the e¢ cient one.4
2.2 Monopolistic competition with unobservable qual-
ity
We now assume that, as with many durable goods, consumers can observe
the quality of the good -or service- only after purchasing it. This feature
modi￿es the model above in very important ways. In particular, note that
each ￿rm now faces a ￿time inconsistency problem￿ . As is clear from the
expression for pro￿ts, (4) in each period t, once the consumers have paid the
price of the good, p(i)t, under the expectation that the good is of high quality,
q(i)t = 1, it is optimal to provide no services, q(i)t = 0, and save the costs
of production, as long as this does not a⁄ect future expectations. Of course,
the ￿rms may refrain from doing so, if this action can a⁄ect future demand,
since after observing low quality the consumers might choose y(i)t+j = 0,
j ￿ 1. In this section, we develop a model of trust to analyze this problem.
Let p(i)t 2 <+ denote the price set by ￿rm i in period t for a unit of good
i, in units of time. Then, if the ￿rm produces with quality q(i)t, the price per
4An alternative way to model imperfect competition is to assume that goods are perfect
substitutes but production requires ￿xed entry costs, as in Salop(1979) circular-city-model.
The lower the ￿xed costs, the stronger is competition and the lower the equilibrium mark-
ups. Thus, there is a clear connection between lower values of ￿ in Dixit-Stiglitz and lower
￿xed costs in Salop. In fact, the same results go through in both models.
8unit of service is pq(i)t = p(i)t=q(i)t. Since q(i)t can take the values zero or
one, the price per unit of service is in the extended reals, pq(i)t 2 <+ [f1g.
Let ￿i;t(p(i)t) = Prfpq(i)t = p(i)tg; i.e., the probability that ￿rm i sets the
price per unit of quality pq(i)t equal to p(i)t: Since p(i)t < 1, ￿i;t(p(i)t) is
the probability that quality is high. Let ht be the information available to
a ￿rm at the moment of making period t decisions. That is, h0 = f;g and,












The representative household simply decides how much to work and to
purchase of every service, i.e., (nt;y(i)t;for all i); given the available infor-
mation, which in period t is fht;p(i)t, for all ig; and the expectations on the
quality of the service. An allocation rule is a ￿ = f￿tg, where, ￿t(ht;p(i)t;
all i) = (nt;y(i)t;all i). Let ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t) denote the belief that, given history
ht and price p(i)t, the price of good i per unit of quality, pq(i)t; is equal
to the observed price, p(i)t. That is, ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t) is the assessed probability
that quality is high, q(i)t = 1. Notice that we implicitly assume that beliefs
about ￿rm i do not depend on other ￿rms￿prices. Consumers￿beliefs are










such that, for every (t;ht)
1. ￿
f
i;t(ht) solves the problem of ￿rm i,




t(ht;p(i)t) = ￿i;t(p(i)t); and
3. (nt;y(i)t; all i) = ￿t(ht;p(i)t; all i) solves the problem of the house-
hold, given beliefs ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t); all i, and satis￿es the market clearing
condition
R 1
0 y(i)tq(i)tdi = nt.
A Sustainable Monopolistic Competitive Equilibrium (SMCE) provides a
natural framework to study the interactions between competition and trust.
5As in Kreps and Wilson (1982)￿Sequential Equilibrium and as in Perfect (Extended)
Bayesian Equilibrium we impose consistency conditions. However, in our imperfect in-
formation environment, a simple form of consistency on relative beliefs su¢ ces (see, for
example, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, Ch. 8 and Battigalli, 1996).
9On the one hand, as long as ￿ is strictly larger than one, the economy exhibits
monopolistic power, and as ￿ gets close to one, the competition between ￿rms
is increased. On the other hand, in making quality decisions, ￿rms care about
their reputation since quality provision has strategic implications.
Notice that the (3) requirement is simply that consumers￿ s allocations
satisfy their demands. In particular, given (ht;p(i)t), and ￿ = ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t),







In what follows, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria in the sense
that all ￿rms behave the same way, so expectations about quality are the
same for every good.
In order to stress the pervasive e⁄ects of assuming that the quality is
only observed after purchasing the good, let us consider an equilibrium where
strategies do not depend on histories. If current actions of the ￿rms do not
a⁄ect the consumers￿expectations about future quality, then, no matter what
the price is, it is a dominant strategy for the ￿rms to choose to provide the
low quality, q(i)t = 0, to save on production costs. If the ￿rm produces
low quality, then for any price p(i)t, if ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t) = 0, consumer￿ s expecta-
tions are ful￿lled. The resulting payo⁄s are zero. The ￿rms can guarantee
themselves this payo⁄, independently of the beliefs, so that this is the worst
SMCE. More formally,
Proposition 1 There exist low quality SMCE, supported by strategies ￿
f
i;t(ht) =
(p(i)t;0), and beliefs ￿i
t(ht;p(i)t) = 0; with their corresponding allocations
(nt;y(i)t) = (0;0), for all i and (t;ht): Furthermore, there is no SMCE with
lower payo⁄s for the ￿rms.
Incidentally, note that this is the unique SMCE (payo⁄) in which strate-
gies do not depend on histories. In this case no ￿rm is ever trusted to provide
high quality. This would be the unique outcome if ￿rms where anonymous
players not accountable for their past quality decisions.
The next step is to determine under what conditions the equilibrium
outcome with perfect observability, described in the previous section, is the
outcome of a SMCE. In order to check this, we consider the standard trigger
strategies of reversion to the worst SMCE strategies.
10Consider the stationary path
p(i)t = p;￿i;t(p) = 1; y(i)t = yp;np = yp
where U0(yp) = ￿p. We want to ￿nd conditions under which this outcome is







i;t(ht) = (p;1), if p




0(h0; p(i)0) = 1 if p(i)0 = p and ￿
i
0(h0; p(i)0) = 0; otherwise
￿
i
t(ht;p(i)t) = 1; if p





t;p(i)t) = 0 otherwise.
￿0(h0;p(i)0) = (np;yp) if p(i)0 = p ,
￿0(h0;p(i)0) = (0;0) if p(i)0 6= p
￿t(ht;p(i)t) = (np;yp) if p
q(i)n = p(i)n = p, 0 ￿ n < t and p(i)t = p
￿t(ht;p(i)t) = (0;0)otherwise.
Consider ￿rst the monopolistic competition outcome with perfect observ-
ability; that is, p = ￿ and y￿ = y: Notice that, if it is sequentially rational
for ￿rms to produce high quality with probability one, then the above strate-
gies for the consumers will be sequentially rational, since they were optimal
choices with perfect observability.
If the ￿rm does indeed deliver the high quality good, then the pro￿ts,
each period, will be given by ￿(i) = (￿ ￿ 1)y and, therefore, the present
value of pro￿ts, after high quality is observed in all previous periods and the
current price is ￿; are given by (￿￿1)y=(1￿￿): On the other hand, if the ￿rm
deviates -say, in period t- and delivers the low quality good, while setting
the price p(i)t = ￿; the current pro￿ts will be ￿y and the present value of
pro￿ts, after pq(i)t = 1 is observed the last period (or any previous period),
are zero. Thus, the ￿rm chooses not to deviate and produce high quality if




11Let ￿ = 1=(1 + ￿); then the ￿rm will choose not to deviate when
￿ ￿ 1 + ￿:
Thus, we have shown the following proposition
Proposition 2 If the market power is high enough, so that the mark-up
is greater than or equal to the discount rate, then the perfect information
equilibrium is the outcome of a SMCE.
The intuition of the last proposition is clear. Given that the ￿rm has
the option of making a short run pro￿t by selling low quality goods, the
equilibrium mark-up must be high enough for the ￿rm not to choose to do
it. As the equilibrium pro￿ts are accrued over time, the discount rate -as an
indicator of the observability lag- matters.
This is the intuition of the Industrial Organization literature on unobserv-
able quality, and the ￿rst quotations go back to Adam Smith. If by reducing
the quality the ￿rm can make short run pro￿ts, a trust argument can explain
why ￿rms decide not to do so. As we have just seen, reputation is valuable
when ￿rms make positive pro￿ts in equilibrium. But, as competition gets
tighter, i.e., in our model ￿ gets arbitrarily close to 1; monopolistic rents
disappear and the equilibrium with perfect observability may not be sustain-
able through reputation if the discount rate is high enough. Notice that the
time period can be seen as the time that it takes for consumers to observe
the quality of the goods. The shorter is the information lag, the smaller
is the discount rate, and the easier to sustain the equilibrium with perfect
observability. Nevertheless, as long as ￿ > 0, the Pareto e¢ cient solution is
never attained.
So far, we have only shown under which conditions is the perfect infor-
mation equilibrium a SMCE. However, it should be clear that the above
argument applies to any outcome de￿ned by p and yp, as long as p ￿ 1 + ￿.
In this case, the choices are sequentially rational since consumers satisfy their
demands at p(i)t = pq(i)t = p; ￿rms make non-negative pro￿ts and any devia-
tion is punished. In particular, a price deviation is instantaneously punished
by triggering the beliefs that the ￿rm is producing low quality. It follows
that a price deviation is dominated by choosing to announce p(i)t = p and
delivering high quality. In summary,
Proposition 3 There exists a stationary SMCE outcome where the price per
unit of service is p and ￿rms always produce high quality i⁄ p ￿ 1 + ￿:
12This analysis shows how high quality can be maintained through reputa-
tion, but there is no role for competition. In fact, if consumer expectations
depend on price and quality history, there are no dimensions along which
the ￿rms can actually compete. In fact, the particular value the elasticity
of substitution takes, a key parameter when the quality is observable, be-
comes irrelevant once this standard trust mechanism is in place. Consumers
expectations alone determine the whole set of restrictions that the ￿rms face.
3 A model of currency competition
In this section we present a model to study competition between pro￿t max-
imizing currency issuers. As before, we focus on the interaction between
competition and trust in the private provision of money and, in particular,
whether it can be an e¢ cient monetary arrangement. Although the model
itself is somewhat di⁄erent from the experience goods model and the exis-
tence of money introduces non-trivial dynamics which were not present in
that model, the ways in which competition and trust interact are strikingly
similar.
3.1 Currency competition with commitment
3.1.1 The model
In the monetary economy, there is a single consumption good and consumers￿
preferences are given by
P1
t=0 ￿
t [U(ct) ￿ ￿nt], where U satis￿es the same
monotonicity and concavity assumptions of the previous section. As before,
the technology is linear in labor, with a unitary coe¢ cient. We allow for free
entry into the production of the good, so that ￿rms will make zero pro￿ts in
equilibrium and the price of consumption in terms of labor will be one.
We assume that consumers must buy the consumption good with a com-
posite of the continuum of all possible di⁄erentiated currencies. This com-








, ￿ > 1
where m(i)t is the real value of type i money, used for transactions at time
t. The monies are imperfect substitutes but we consider imperfect substi-
tutability only as a methodological device to study the limiting economy
13where substitutability is arbitrarily large. In the limit each of the monies
is general purchasing power. This model is a natural framework to analyze
Hayek￿ s conjecture that money can be supplied e¢ ciently by the market,
and, as such, it contains interesting implications for monetary theory.
We analyze the limiting economy as the degree of substitutability is ar-
bitrarily large instead of the case of perfect substitutability because it is a
natural way of dealing with the indeterminacy of money demands that arises
when the monies are perfect substitutes.6 When that is the case, in equilib-
rium all currencies must have the same return and only the total value of the
currencies will be determined. The share of each currency in the portfolio,
and hence the real demand for each currency, is indeterminate. For given
supplies of the di⁄erent monies the price levels are indeterminate. Thus,
whether a given policy is time consistent depends on the arbitrary rule to
pin down an equilibrium. For this reason we conduct our analysis when the
degree of substitutability is ￿nite, so that the real money demands are well
de￿ned and no indeterminacy arises.












di + ￿t; t ￿ 0
where P(i)t is the price of the consumption good in units of money i and
M(i)t is the quantity of money i, held from time t￿1 to time t, and used for
transactions at time t, so that m(i)t =
M(i)t
P(i)t . ￿(i)t are the current pro￿ts of
the provider of currency i in units of the consumption good, ￿t =
R 1
0 ￿(i)tdi.
Every period t; the consumer purchases M(i)t+1 of currency i and real bonds
bt+1 that pay the real interest rate rt+1 in period t+1. This budget constraint







m(i)tdi+￿t; t ￿ 0
(9)
6In Marimon, Nicolini and Teles (2003), we analyze the case of competition between
inside money and outside money, when both are perfect substitutes. In that model we
assume that when the returns are the same the households opt for currency. We also
assume that the suppliers of inside money are small and not distinguishable, which removes




The cash-in-advance constraint is









Let R(i)t+1 be the gross nominal interest rate from time t to t + 1 on
money i, so that R(i)t+1 = (1 + rt+1)(1 + ￿(i)t+1), and let







Then, the ￿rst order conditions of the consumer￿ s problem imply:
U
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+ d(i)t(1 + ￿) + ￿(i)t
where d(i)t is the debt issued by the i-currency issuer at time t, in units of the
consumption good, and ￿(i)t are the pro￿ts of the money issuer in units of
the consumption good. It also faces the corresponding non-Ponzi constraints
guaranteeing that the present value budget constraint is well de￿ned. The















In order to maximize the present value of pro￿ts, ￿rms must choose ￿(i)t
to maximize
(R(i)t ￿ 1)m(i)t
15taking the demands for currency (11) as given. They must also minimize
M(i)0
P(i)0 : Notice that, as in standard (single currency) monetary models, a mon-
etary policy for the i-currency issuer consists of a current price level and a
sequence of future nominal interest rates: (P(i)0;fR(i)tg
1
t=1):
3.1.2 Equilibria with commitment
Regarding monetary policies, optimality requires the initial price level to be
arbitrarily high such that the real value of initial outstanding money holdings
(liabilities)
M(i)0
P(i)0 becomes zero. This is achieved through a big open market
operation in which the currency is sold back to the consumers. Each currency
issuer takes a negative position in bond holdings, in an amount equal to the
real quantity of money. In subsequent periods, the currency issuer collects
the real rate of interest on those loans, as well as the in￿ ation rate on real
money holdings, corresponding to future money issuing.
To characterize the problem of maximizing time t pro￿ts, notice that to
maximize
(R(i)t ￿ 1)m(i)t
subject to (11), results in the choice
R(i)t = ￿
This is not surprising, since this maximization problem is the same, in the
quality-goods model, as that of maximizing (4) subject to (3). We only
need to identify the gross nominal interest rate, in the currency competition
model, R(i)t with the price p(i)t in the quality-goods model, and m(i)t with
y(i)t: As in the previous model, with these prices, the consumption of the
goods, y = m, is constant and satis￿es U0(y) = ￿￿.
It follows that, as currency substitution increases, i.e., ￿ & 1; nominal
interest rates tend to zero, i.e., (R(i)t ￿ 1) & 0, which is supported by a de-
￿ ationary monetary policy, i.e., ￿(i)t & (￿￿1): In other words, with perfect
substitution of private currencies the monetary equilibrium is e¢ cient and
the Friedman rule is implemented. Thus, with full commitment, Hayek￿ s con-
jecture, that e¢ cient monetary equilibria can be achieved through currency
competition, is veri￿ed.
Nevertheless, as in standard (single currency) monetary models, the full
commitment monetary policy is time inconsistent. This can easily be seen
16by considering how the budget constraints of a currency issuer evolves over















Thus, if given the option to change plans at time t;which we rule out when
assuming full commitment, the currency issuer will ￿nd it optimal to expand
the money supply and let P(i)t increase without bound. The reason is that
the real money demand is decreasing in the nominal interest rates, i.e., in
expected future prices. However, once consumers have made their currency
decisions, the nominal money demand is rigid with respect to the realized
price. We turn now to analyze the case without commitment.
3.2 Currency competition without commitment
As there is a parallel between quality-goods competition with perfect observ-
ability and currency competition with full commitment, there is a parallel
between quality-goods competition with unobservable quality and currency
competition without commitment. More speci￿cally, in both models ￿rms
compete in prices that are not observable or that they cannot commit to:
In the quality-goods model, this is the price of the good per unit of qual-
ity; in the currency competition model it is the nominal interest rate, or the
in￿ ation rate. With perfect observability in the ￿rst model and with full
commitment in the second, there is no distinction between set and realized
prices. With unobservable quality in the ￿rst model and lack of commitment
in the second, we have to consider o⁄-equilibrium paths where the ex-post
realized prices may di⁄er from the ex-ante prices. In fact, in such a case,
￿rms maximize short run pro￿ts by setting an arbitrarily large realized price,
which in the quality model corresponds to choosing low quality and in the
currency model to in￿ ate away current money holdings (i.e., in making ￿the
quality of outstanding money￿arbitrarily low). In both models, the tim-
ing is very important:7 Consumers purchase services before they observe the
quality they yield, in one, and they purchase monies before they observe
7In a paper that also addresses the issue of competition in a time inconsistency setting,
Kehoe(1989), used a di⁄erent timing, and obtained the result that competition could solve
the time consistency problem.
17the real return they yield, in the other; in both models, consumers must
form their expectations on realized prices, based on past information and
current prices, and, in both models, reputation is what may prevent ￿rms
from ￿￿ ying-by-night.￿
More formally, while monopolistic ￿rms in the quality-goods model se-





R(i)t+1 2 <+ is an ex-ante gross nominal interest rate, between period t and
t + 1. Since bonds are real, this interest rate is not a return on bonds. It
works as an announcement of the price of holding money. Note that given a
history, picking the price level at time t; is equivalent to picking the ex-post
nominal interest rate Rq(i)t = (1+￿)(1+
P(i)t
P(i)t￿1), except for the ￿rst period,
since P(i)￿1 is not de￿ned. Because the price level can be made arbitrarily
large, Rq(i)t 2 <+ [ f1g. This notation helps keeping the parallel with the
monopolistic competition model.
We can now de￿ne a ￿Sustainable Currency Competition Equilibrium￿
(SCCE) in a similar fashion as we have de￿ned SMCE in the quality-goods
model. Histories are given by h￿1 = f;g, h0 = fh￿1;P(i)0;R(i)1g and
ht =
￿
ht￿1;R(i)t+1 ;Rq(i)t; all i
￿




i;0(h￿1) = (R(i)1;P(i)0); and
￿
b
i;t(ht￿1) = (R(i)t+1;￿i;t); for t ￿ 1
where ￿i;t is a density function on R+, such that ￿i;t(ht￿1;Rq(i)t) is the
density of Rq(i)t; conditional on ht￿1:8
Consumers behave competitively, deciding ￿c
t(ht) = fct;nt; bt+1;M(i)t+1;all ig
, for t ￿ 0; based on ￿i
t - their beliefs about future decisions of the currency
issuers - and corresponding equilibrium prices. ￿i
t(ht;Rq(i)t+1) denotes the
assessed density of the ex-post interest rate Rq(i)t+1: Rational expectations











, such that, for every (t;ht); ￿b
i;t(ht￿1)
solves the maximization problem of the i-currency issuer; ￿c
t(ht) solves the
8Since issuers decide on P(i)0 before consumers make any decision, there is no need to
introduce mixed strategies on that decision.
9Note that at time t, consumer￿ s care about future monetary policy, that is why time
t beliefs ought to be the same as ￿rm￿ s strategies at t + 1:
18consumer￿ s problem given consistent beliefs ￿i
t(ht;Rq(i)t+1); and all markets
clear.
As with SMCE, there is a worst SCCE in which currencies are not held,
since agents expect realized nominal interest rates to be arbitrarily large.
We check now whether a stationary gross nominal interest rate, R = R(i),
is sustainable as a SCCE. Suppose that the i-currency issuer considers a
deviation in period t > 0; letting Rq(i)t ! 1, by printing arbitrarily large
amounts of money. Suppose that agents￿expectations are such that, after
observing that the ex-post rate di⁄ers from the ex-ante rate, they become
￿
c;i
t+s(ht+s;Rq(i)t+1+s = 1) = 1, for any ht+s; s ￿ 0. Given such beliefs, real
money demand for that currency is zero from time t on, i.e., m(i)t+s = 0,
s ￿ 0, which means that the newly issued pieces of paper are worthless.
The value of the outcome after the deviation is zero, except for the value
of the outstanding real debt. The reason is that the deviation triggers a
currency collapse for that currency, starting tomorrow. But, contrary to the
quality-goods model with unobserved quality, the demand for money, being
an asset, depends on future prices. Thus, the expectations of the currency
collapse make the newly injected money be worthless today. Therefore, the
present value of the bene￿ts following a deviation is obtained by replacing



















￿1(R(i) ￿ 1)m(i) ￿ m(i) ￿ d(i)t￿
￿1
The last equality follows from the fact that, in equilibrium, m(i) =
M(i)t
P(i)t : It




￿1(R(i) ￿ 1) ￿ 1
￿
￿ 0;
i.e., R(i) ￿ 1 + ￿
19or, equivalently, whenever ￿(i) ￿ 0:
As in the previous model, the set of stationary SCCE is large. More
formally, the following proposition parallels Proposition 3.
Proposition 4 A policy (￿(i) = ￿) is an outcome of a stationary symmetric
SCCE i⁄ ￿ ￿ 0.
An equilibrium path with symmetric stationary policies is sustainable if
and only if the corresponding in￿ ation rates are positive. The reason why
in￿ ation must be positive is because of the timing of collection of revenues
for the issuers. Remember that along the commitment solution, the issuers
make initial money holdings be valueless and, by an open market operation
they sell back the new money balances to the consumers. Thus, at the ￿rst
period the issuers hold positive assets in an amount equal to the real balances.
From those assets they collect the real rate of interest, ￿: Thereafter, they
also collect the in￿ ation rate times the real money balances every period. If
they deviate, they will keep the real asset holdings only.10 Thus, as long as
the returns they make with the in￿ ation tax are non-negative, they have no
incentives to deviate. In other words, future pro￿ts must be su¢ ciently high,
and, in this monetary environment, future pro￿ts are the gains from future
issuance of money. The gains corresponding to the initial issuance of money,
the real rate on the real money stock, are sunk.
In summary, without full commitment, Hayek￿ s conjecture, that e¢ cient
monetary equilibria can be achieved through currency competition, is not
veri￿ed, as long as optimality requires de￿ ation in equilibrium, as in Fried-
man·s rule.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, in order to answer an old question in monetary theory ￿can
currency be e¢ ciently provided by competitive markets? ￿we have addressed
the more general issue of how two mechanisms, trust and competition ￿which
supposedly discipline the actions of suppliers of goods, services, and curren-
cies ￿interact. We ￿rst show a ￿ aw in the standard ￿Bertrand competition￿
10Note that if the issuer were forced to hold their own currency denominated assets,
then the e¢ cient outcome could be supported as a SCCE.
20argument when suppliers compete on promises rather than on tangible de-
liveries; we also show how seemingly di⁄erent markets ￿such as experience
goods and currencies ￿share the same basic properties and, therefore, results.
The key issue is whether promises can be ￿ automatically trusted￿ , and expec-
tations based on them always ful￿lled. In the provision of currencies (and
other ￿nancial assets) promised returns ful￿ll consumers￿expectations when
currency suppliers are fully committed to their promises. Similarly, with ex-
perience goods promised and realized qualities are the same when quality is
observable. In these contexts, trust is automatically achieved and the com-
petition mechanism results in an e¢ cient allocation provided suppliers do
not have monopolistic power.
However, expectations based on promises may not be automatically ful-
￿lled: either because suppliers cannot commit to future actions (in the case
of currencies, the policy of maintaining future prices to achieve the promised
returns), or because their actions are hidden (in the case of experience goods,
the e⁄ort of implementing the promised quality). In these contexts, it must
be in the interest of suppliers to be trustworthy: future rewards must compen-
sate the temptation to renege on their promises. The need for such future
rewards determines a lower bound on the degree of e¢ ciency that can be
achieved in these markets. In the experience goods market the lower bound
requires that the mark up be as least as high as the rate of time preferences;
in the currencies market the lower bound requires non-negative in￿ ation and,
therefore, positive nominal interest rates, away from the Friedman￿ s rule of
zero nominal interest rates. A ￿rst corollary of this result is that Hayek￿ s con-
jecture, that e¢ cient monetary equilibria can be achieved through currency
competition is not veri￿ed if currency suppliers make sequential decisions.
There is a second, somewhat disturbing, corollary to the previous result.
Once the ￿trust mechanism￿works it fully determines which equilibrium is
achieved and, since beliefs sustaining trust are fairly arbitrary, there is an
indeterminacy of such equilibria. That is, any e⁄ective mark-up above the
discount rate, or any positive in￿ ation, can be part of a stationary equilib-
rium outcome. In other words, the competition mechanism plays no role.
Placing restrictions on beliefs can change this last result. In particular, the
indeterminacy problem arises because consumers use announced promises to
coordinate their beliefs (on price per unit of quality, or on future nominal
interest rates) and, therefore, any announcement satisfying the lower bound
condition can be sustained as an equilibrium with a belief that trusts the
announcement and mistrusts any deviation, even deviations which enhance
21e¢ ciency. Restrictions on beliefs that allow the latter deviations may restore
a role for competition. We have not pursued this issue here.
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